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ABSTRACT. Canonical models are of central importance in modal logic, in particular as they wit-
ness strong completeness and hence compactness. While the canonical model construction is well
understood for Kripke semantics, non-normal modal logics often present subtle difficulties – up to
the point that canonical models may fail to exist, as is the case e.g. in most probabilistic logics. Here,
we present a generic canonical model construction in the semantic framework of coalgebraic modal
logic, which pinpoints coherence conditions between syntax and semantics of modal logics that guar-
antee strong completeness. We apply this method to reconstruct canonical model theorems that are
either known or folklore, and moreover instantiate our method to obtain new strong completeness
results. In particular, we prove strong completeness of graded modal logic with finite multiplicities,
and of the modal logic of exact probabilities.
In modal logic, completeness proofs come in two flavours: weak completeness, i.e. derivability of
all universally valid formulas, is often proved using finite model constructions, and strong com-
pleteness, which additionally allows for a possibly infinite set of assumptions. The latter entails
recursive enumerability of the set of consequences of a recursively enumerable set of assumptions,
and is usually established using (infinite) canonical models. The appeal of the first method is that it
typically entails decidability. The second method yields a stronger result and has some advantages
of its own. First, it applies in some cases where finite models fail to exist, which often means that the
logic at hand is undecidable. In such cases, a completeness proof via canonical models will at least
salvage recursive enumerability. Second, it allows for schematic axiomatisations, e.g. pertaining to
the infinite evolution of a system or to observational equivalence, i.e. statements to the effect that
certain states cannot be distinguished by any formula.
In the realm of Kripke semantics, canonical models exist for a large variety of logics and are
well understood, see e.g. [2]. But there is more to modal logic than Kripke semantics, and indeed
the natural semantic structures used to interpret a large class of modal logics go beyond pure re-
lations. This includes e.g. the selection function semantics of conditional logics [4], the semantics
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of probabilistic logics in terms of probability distributions, and the game frame semantics of coali-
tion logic [16]. To date, there is very little research that provides systematic criteria, or at least
a methodology, for establishing strong completeness for logics not amenable to Kripke semantics.
This is made worse as the question of strong completeness crucially depends on the chosen semantic
domain, which as illustrated above may differ widely. It is precisely this variety in semantics that
makes it hard to employ the strong-completeness-via-canonicity approach, as in many cases there
is no readily available notion of canonical model. The present work improves on this situation by
providing a widely applicable generic canonical model construction. More precisely, we establish
the existence of quasi-canonical models, that is, models based on the set of maximally consistent
sets of formulas that satisfy the truth lemma, as there may be no unique, or canonical, such model in
our more general case. In order to cover the large span of semantic structures, we avoid a commit-
ment to a particular class of models, and instead work within the framework of coalgebraic modal
logic [15] which precisely provides us with a semantic umbrella for all of the examples above. This
is achieved by using coalgebras for an endofunctor T as the semantic domain for modal languages.
As we illustrate in examples, the semantics of particular logics is then obtained by particular choices
of T . Coalgebraic modal logic serves in particular as a general semantic framework for non-normal
modal logics. As such, it improves on neighbourhood semantics in that it retains the full semantic
structure of the original models (neighbourhood semantics offers only very little actual semantic
structure, and in fact may be regarded as constructed from syntactic material [18]).
In this setting, our criterion can be formulated as a set of coherence conditions that relate
the syntactic component of a logic to its coalgebraic semantics, together with a purely semantic
condition stating that the endofunctor T that defines the semantics needs to preserve inverse limits
weakly, and thus allows for a passage from the finite to the infinite. We are initially concerned with
the existence of quasi-canonical models relative to the class of all T -coalgebras, that is, whith logics
that are axiomatisable by formulas of modal depth uniformly equal to one [17]. As in the classical
theory, the corresponding result for logics with extra frame conditions requires that the logic is
canonical, i.e. the frame that underlies a quasi-canonical model satisfies the frame conditions, which
holds in most cases, but for the time being needs to be established individually for each logic.
Our new criterion is then used to obtain both previously known and novel strong completeness
results. In addition to positive results, we dissect a number of logics for which strong completeness
fails and show which assumption of our criterion is violated. In particular, this provides a handle
on adjusting either the syntax or the semantics of the logic at hand to achieve strong completeness.
For example, we demonstrate that the failure of strong completeness for probabilistic modal logic
(witnessed e.g. by the set of formulas assigning probability ≥ 1 − 1/n to an event for all n but ex-
cluding probability 1) disappears in the logic of exact probabilities. Moreover, we show that graded
modal logic, and more generally any description logic [1] with qualified number restrictions, role
hierarchies, and reflexive, transitive, and symmetric roles, is strongly complete over the multigraph
model of [5], which admits infinite multiplicities. While strong completeness fails for the naive
restriction of this model to multigraphs allowing only finite multiplicities, we show how to salvage
strong completeness using additive (finite-)integer-valued measures. Finally, we prove strong com-
pleteness of several conditional logics w.r.t. conditional frames (also known as selection function
models); for at least one of these logics, strong completeness was previously unknown.
1. Preliminaries and Notation
Our treatment of strong completeness is parametric in both the syntax and the semantics of a wide
range of modal logics. On the syntactic side, we fix a modal similarity type Λ consisting of modal
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operators with associated arities. Given a similarity type Λ and a countable set P of atomic propo-
sitions, the set F(Λ) of Λ-formulas is inductively defined by the grammar
(Λ) ∋ φ,ψ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | L(φ1, . . . , φn)
where p ∈ P and L ∈ Λ is n-ary; further boolean operators (∨, →, ↔, ⊤) are defined as usual.
Given any set X (e.g. of formulas, atomic propositions, or sets (!)), we write Prop(X) for the set
of propositional formulas over X and Λ(X) = {L(x1, . . . , xn) | L ∈ Λ is n-ary, x1, . . . , xn ∈ X}
for the set of formulas arising by applying exactly one operator to elements of X. We instantiate
our results to a variety of settings later with the following similarity types:
Examples 1.1. 1. The similarity type ΛK of standard modal logic consists of a single unary
operator ✷.
2. Conditional logic [4] is defined over the similarity type ΛCL = {⇒} where the binary operator
⇒ is read as a non-monotonic conditional (default, relevant etc.), usually written in infix notation.
3. Graded modal operators [8] appear in expressive description logics [1] in the guise of so-called
qualified number restrictions; although we discuss only modal aspects, we use mostly description
logic notation and terminology below. The operators of graded modal logic (GML) are ΛGML =
{(≥ k) | k ∈ N} with (≥ k) unary. We write ≥ k. φ instead of (≥ k)φ. A formula ≥ k. φ is read as
‘at least k successor states satisfy φ’, and we abreviate ✷φ = ¬≥ 1.¬φ.
4. The similarity type ΛPML of probabilistic modal logic (PML) [14] contains the unary modal
operators Lp for p ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], read as ‘with probability at least p, . . . ’.
We split axiomatisations of modal logics into two parts: the first group of axioms is responsible for
axiomatising the logic w.r.t. the class of all (coalgebraic) models, whereas the second consists of
frame conditions that impose additional conditions on models. As the class of all coalgebraic mod-
els, introduced below, can always be axiomatised by formulas of rank 1, i.e. containing exactly one
level of modal operators [17] (and conversely, every collection of such axioms admits a complete
coalgebraic semantics [18]), we restrict the axioms in the first group accordingly. More formally:
Definition 1.2. A (modal) logic is a triple L = (Λ,A,Θ) where Λ is a similarity type, A ⊆
Prop(Λ(Prop(P ))) is a set of rank-1 axioms, and Θ ⊆ (Λ) is a set of frame conditions. We
say that L is a rank-1 logic if Θ = ∅. If φ ∈ (Λ), we write ⊢L φ if φ can be derived from
A∪Θ with the help of propositional reasoning, uniform substitution, and the congruence rule: from
φ1 ↔ ψ1, . . . , φn ↔ ψn infer L(φ1, . . . , φn) ↔ L(ψ1, . . . , ψn) whenever L ∈ Λ is n-ary. For
a set Φ ⊆ (Λ) of assumptions, we write Φ ⊢L φ if ⊢L φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn → φ for (finitely many)
φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Φ. A set Φ is L-inconsistent if Φ ⊢L ⊥, and otherwise L-consistent.
Examples 1.3. 1. The modal logic K comes about as the rank-1 logic (ΛK ,AK , ∅) where Ak =
{✷⊤,✷(p → q) → (✷p → ✷q)}. The logics K4, S4,KB, . . . arise as (ΛK ,AK ,Θ) where Θ
contains the additional axioms that define the respective logic [2], e.g. Θ = {✷p → ✷✷p} in the
case of K4.
2. For conditional logic, we take the similarity type ΛCL together with rank-1 axioms r ⇒ ⊤,
r ⇒ (p → q) → ((r ⇒ p) → (r ⇒ q)) stating that the binary conditional is normal in its second
argument. Typical additional rank-1 axioms are
(ID) a⇒ a (identity)
(DIS) (a⇒ c) ∧ (b⇒ c)→ ((a ∨ b)⇒ c) (disjunction)
(CM) (a⇒ c) ∧ (a⇒ b)→ ((a ∧ b)⇒ c) (cautious monotony)
which together form the so-called System C, a modal version of the well-known KLM
(Krauss/Lehmannn/Magidor) axioms of default reasoning due to Burgess [3].
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3. The axiomatisation of GML given in [8] consists of the rank-1 axioms
✷(p→ q)→ (✷p→ ✷q)
≥ k. p→ ≥ l. p for l < k
≥ k. p↔
∨
i=0,...,k≥ i. (p ∧ q) ∧ ≥(k − i). (p ∧ ¬q)
✷(p→ q)→ (≥ k. p→ ≥ k. q)
Frame conditions of interest include e.g. reflexivity (p → ≥ 1. p), symmetry (p → ✷ ≥ 1. p), and
transitivity (≥ 1. ≥n. p→ ≥n. p).
To keep our results parametric also in the semantics of modal logic, we work in the framework of
coalgebraic modal logic in order to achieve a uniform and coherent presentation. In this framework,
the particular shape of models is encapsulated by an endofunctor T : Set → Set, the signature
functor (recall that such a functor maps every set X to a set TX, and every map f : X → Y to a
map Tf : TX → TY in such a way that composition and identities are preserved), which may be
thought of as a parametrised data type. We fix the data Λ, L, T etc. throughout the generic part of
the development. The role of models in then played by T -coalgebras:
Definition 1.4. A T -coalgebra is a pair C = (C, γ) where C is a set (the state space of C) and
γ : C → TC is a function, the transition structure of C.
We think of TC as a type of successors, polymorphic in C . The transition structure γ associates
a structured collection of successors γ(c) to each state x ∈ C . The following choices of signature
functors give rise to the semantics of the modal logics discussed in Expl. 1.3.
Examples 1.5. 1. Coalgebras for the covariant powerset functor P defined on setsX byP(X) =
{A | A ⊆ X} and on maps f by P(f)(A) = f [A] are Kripke frames, as relations R ⊆ W ×W
on a set W of worlds are in bijection with functions of type W → P(W ). Restricting the powerset
functor to finite subsets, i.e. putting Pω(X) = {A ⊆ X | A finite}, one obtains the class of image
finite Kripke frames as Pω-coalgebras.
2. The semantics of conditional logic is captured coalgebraically by the endofunctor S that maps
a set X to the set (P(X) → P(X)) of selection functions over X (the action of S on functions
f : X → Y is given by S(f)(s)(B) = f [s(f−1[B])]). The ensuing S-coalgebras are precisely the
conditional frames of [4].
3. The (infinite) multiset functor B∞ maps a set X to the set B∞X of multisets over X, i.e.
functions of type X → N∪ {∞}. Accordingly, B∞-coalgebras are multigraphs (graphs with edges
annotated by multiplicities). Multigraphs provide an alternative semantics for GML which is in
many respects more natural than the original Kripke semantics [5], as also confirmed by new results
below.
4. Finally, if supp(µ) = {x ∈ X | µ(x) 6= 0} is the support of a function µ : X → [0, 1]
and D(X) = {µ : X → [0, 1] | supp(µ) finite,
∑
x∈X µ(x) = 1} is the set of finitely supported
probability distributions on X, then D-coagebras are probabilistic transition systems, the semantic
domain of PML.
The link between coalgebras and modal languages is provided by predicate liftings [15], which are
used to interpret modal operators. Essentially, predicate liftings convert predicates on the state space
X into predicates on the set TX of structured collections of states:
Definition 1.6. [15] An n-ary predicate lifting (n ∈ N) for T is a family of maps λX : PXn →
PTX , where X ranges over all sets, satisfying the naturality condition
λX(f
−1[A1], . . . , f
−1[An]) = (Tf)
−1[λY (A1, . . . , An)]
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for all f : X → Y , A1, . . . , An ∈ PY . (For the categorically minded, λ is a natural transformation
Qn → Q ◦ T op, where Q denotes contravariant powerset.) A structure for a similarity type Λ over
an endofunctor T is the assignment of an n-ary predicate lifting JLK to every n-ary modal operator
L ∈ Λ.
Given a valuation V : P → P(C) of the propositional variables and a T -coalgebra (C, γ), a
structure for Λ allows us to define a satisfaction relation |=(C,γ,V ) between states of C and formulas
φ ∈ (Λ) by stipulating that c |=(C,γ,V ) p iff c ∈ V (p) and
c |=(C,γ,V ) L(φ1, . . . , φn) iff γ(c) ∈ JLKC(Jφ1K, . . . , JφnK),
where JφK = {c ∈ C | c |=(C,γ,V ) φ}. An L-model is now a model, i.e. a triple (C, γ, V ) as above,
such that c |=(C,γ,V ) ψ for all all c ∈ C and all substitution instances ψ of A ∪ Θ. An L-frame is
a T -coalgebra (C, γ) such that (C, γ, V ) is an L-model for all valuations V . The reader is invited
to check that the following predicate liftings induce the standard semantics for the modal languages
introduced in Expl. 1.1.
Examples 1.7. 1. A structure for ΛK over the covariant powerset functor P is given by
J✷KX(A) = {Y ∈ P(X) | Y ⊆ A}. The frame classes defined by the frame conditions men-
tioned in Expl. 1.3.1 are well-known; e.g. a Kripke frame (X,R) is a K4-frame iff R is transitive.
2. Putting J⇒KX(A,B) = {f ∈ S(X) | f(A) ⊆ B} reconstructs the semantics of conditional
logic in a coalgebraic setting.
3. A structure for GML overB∞ is given by J(≥ k)KX(A) = {f : X → N∪{∞} |
∑
x∈A f(x) ≥
k}. The frame conditions mentioned in Expl. 1.3.3 correspond to conditions on multigraphs that
can be read off directly from the logical axioms. E.g. a multigraph satisfies the transitivity axiom
≥ 1. ≥n. p → ≥n. p iff whenever x has non-zero transition multiplicity to y and y has transition
multiplicity at least n to z, then x has transition multiplicity at least n to z.
4. The structure over D that captures PML coalgebraically is given by the the predicate lifting
JLpKX(A) = {µ ∈ D(X) |
∑
x∈A µ(x) ≥ p} for p ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q.
From now on, fix a modal logic L = (Λ,A,Θ) and a structure for Λ over a functor T . We say that
L is strongly complete for some class of models if every L-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable
in some state of some model in that class. Restricting to finite sets Φ defines the notion of weak
completeness; many coalgebraic modal logics are only weakly complete [17].
Definition 1.8. Let X be a set. If ψ ∈ F(Λ) and τ : P → P(X) is a valuation, we write ψτ for
the result of substituting τ(p) for p in ψ, with propositional subformulas evaluated according to the
boolean algebra structure ofP(X). (Hence, ψτ is a formula over the setP(X) of atoms.) A formula
φ ∈ Prop(Λ(P(X)) is one-step L-derivable, denoted ⊢1L φ, if φ is propositonally entailed by the
set {ψτ | τ : P → P(X), ψ ∈ A}. A set Φ ⊆ Prop(Λ(P(X))) is one-step L-consistent if there do
not exist formulas φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Φ such that ⊢1L ¬(φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn). Dually, the one-step semantics
JφK1X ⊆ TX of a formula φ ∈ Prop(Λ(P(X)) is defined inductively by JL(A1, . . . , An)K1X =
JLKX(A1, . . . , An) for A1, . . . , An ⊆ X. A set Φ ⊆ Prop(Λ(P(X))) is one-step satisfiable if⋂
φ∈ΦJφK
1
X 6= ∅. We say that L (or Λ) is separating if t ∈ TX is uniquely determined by the set
{φ ∈ Λ(P(X)) | t ∈ [[φ]]1X}. We call L (or A) one-step sound if every one-step derivable formula
φ ∈ Prop(Λ(P(X))) is one-step valid, i.e. JφK1X = X.
Henceforth, we assume that L is one-step sound, so that every T -coalgebra satisfies the rank-1
axioms; in the absence of frame conditions (Θ = ∅), this means in particular that every T -coalgebra
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is an L-frame. The above notions of one-step satisfiability and one-step consistency are the main
concepts employed in the proof of strong completeness in the following section.
Given a structure for Λ over T , every set B of rank-1 axioms over Λ defines a subfunctor TB of
B with TB(X) =
⋂
{[[φτ ]]1X | φ ∈ B, τ : P → P(X)} ⊆ TX. This functor induces a structure for
which B is one-step sound.
Example 1.9. The additional rank-1 axioms of Expl. 1.3.2 induce subfunctors SB of the functor S
of Expl. 1.5.2. E.g. we have
S{ID}X = {f ∈ S(X) | ∀A ⊆ X. f(A) ⊆ A}
S{ID ,DIS}X = {f ∈ S(X) | ∀A,B ⊆ X. f(A) ⊆ A ∧ f(A ∪B) ⊆ f(A) ∪ f(B)}
S{ID ,DIS ,CM}X = {f ∈ S(X) | ∀A,B ⊆ X. f(A) ⊆ A ∧ (f(B) ⊆ A⇒ f(A) ∩B ⊆ f(B))}
(it is an amusing exercise to verify the last claim).
2. Strong Completeness Via Quasi-Canonical Models
We wish to establish strong completeness of L by defining a suitable T -coalgebra structure ζ on
the set S of maximally L-consistent subsets of F(Λ), equipped with the standard valuation V (p) =
{Γ ∈ S | p ∈ Γ}. The crucial property required is that ζ be coherent, i.e.
ζ(Γ) ∈ [[L]](φˆ1, . . . , φˆn) ⇐⇒ L(φ1, . . . , φn) ∈ Γ,
where φˆ = {∆ ∈ S | φ ∈ ∆}, for L ∈ Λ n-ary, Γ ∈ S, and φ1, . . . , φn ∈ F(Λ), as this allows
proving, by a simple induction over the structure of formulas,
Lemma 2.1 (Truth lemma). If ζ is coherent, then for all formulas φ, Γ |=(S,ζ,V ) φ iff φ ∈ Γ.
We define a quasi-canonical model to be a model (S, ζ, V )with ζ coherent; the term quasi-canonical
serves to emphasise that the coherence condition does not determine the transition structure ζ
uniquely. By the truth lemma, quasi-canonical models for L are L-models, i.e. satisfy all sub-
stitution instances of the frame conditions. The first question is now under which circumstances
quasi-canonical models exist; we proceed to establish a widely applicable criterion. This criterion
has two main aspects: a local form of strong completeness involving only finite sets, and a preser-
vation condition on the functor enabling passage from finite sets to certain infinite sets. We begin
with the latter part:
Definition 2.2. A surjective ω-cochain (of finite sets) is a sequence (Xn)n∈N of (finite) sets
equipped with surjective functions pn : Xn+1 → Xn called projections. The inverse limit lim←−Xn
of (Xn) is the set {(xi) ∈
∏
i∈NXi | ∀n. pn(xn+1) = xn} of coherent families (xi). The limit
projections are the maps pii((xn)n∈N) = xi, i ∈ N; note that the pii are surjective, i.e. every x ∈ Xi
can be extended to a coherent family. Since all set functors preserve surjections, (TXn) is a sur-
jective ω-cochain with projections Tpn. The functor T weakly preserves inverse limits of surjective
ω-cochains of finite sets if for every surjective ω-cochain (Xn) of finite sets, the canonical map
T (lim←−Xn)→ lim←−TXn is surjective, i.e. every coherent family (tn) in
∏
TXn is induced by a (not
necessarily unique) t ∈ T (lim←−Xn) in the sense that Tpin(t) = tn for all n.
Example 2.3. Let A be a finite alphabet; then the sets An, n ∈ N, form a surjective ω-cochain of
finite sets with projections pn : An+1 → An, (a1, . . . , an+1) 7→ (a1, . . . , an). The inverse limit
lim←−A
n is the set Aω of infinite sequences over A. The covariant powerset functor P preserves this
inverse limit weakly: given a coherent family of subsets Bn ⊆ An, i.e. pn[Bn+1] = Bn for all n,
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we define the set B ⊆ Aω as the set of all infinite sequences (an)n≥1 such that (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Bn
for all n; it is easy to check that indeed B induces the Bn, i.e. pin[B] = Bn. However, B is by no
means uniquely determined by this property: Observe thatB as just defined is a safety property. The
intersection of B with any liveness property C , e.g. the set C of all infinite sequences containing
infinitely many occurrences of a fixed letter in A, will also satisfy pin[B ∩ C] = Bn for all n.
The second part of our criterion is an infinitary version of a local completeness property called
one-step completeness, which has been used previously in weak completeness proofs [15, 17].
Definition 2.4. We say that L is strongly one-step complete over finite sets if for finite X, every
one-step consistent subset Φ of Prop(Λ(P(X))) is one-step satisfiable.
The difference with plain one-step completeness is that Φ above may be infinite. Consequently,
strong and plain one-step completeness coincide in case the modal similarity type Λ is finite, since
in this case, Prop(Λ(P(X))) is, for finite X, finite up to propositional equivalence. The announced
strong completeness criterion is now the following.
Theorem 2.5. If L is strongly one-step complete over finite sets and separating, Λ is countable,
and T weakly preserves inverse limits of surjective ω-cochains of finite sets, then L has a quasi-
canonical model.
Proof sketch. The most natural argument is via the dual adjunction between sets and boolean alge-
bras that associates to a set the boolean algebra of its subsets, and to a boolean algebra the set of its
ultrafilters. For economy of presentation, we outline a direct proof instead: we prove that
(∗) every maximally one-step consistent Φ ⊆ Prop(Λ(A)) is one-step satisfiable,
where A = {φˆ | φ ∈ F(Λ)} ⊆ P(S).
The existence of the required coherent coalgebra structure ζ on S follows immediately, since the
coherence requirement for ζ(Γ), Γ ∈ S, amounts to one-step satisfaction of a maximally one-step
consistent subset of Prop(Λ(A)).
To prove (∗), let Λ = {Ln | n ∈ N}, let P = {pn | n ∈ N}, let Fn denote the set of Λ-formulas
of modal nesting depth at most n that employ only modal operators from Λn = {L0, . . . , Ln} and
only the atomic propositions p0, . . . , pn, and let Sn be the set of maximally consistent subsets of Fn.
Then S is (isomorphic to) the inverse limit lim
←−
Sn, where the projections Sn+1 → Sn and the limit
projections S → Sn are just intersection withFn. As the sets Sn are finite, we obtain by strong one-
step completeness tn ∈ TSn such that tn |=1Sn Φ∩Prop(Λ(An)), where An = {φˆ∩Sn | φ ∈ Fn}.
By separation, (tn)n∈N is coherent, and hence is induced by some t ∈ TS by weak preservation of
inverse limits; then, t |=1S Φ.
Together with the Lindenbaum Lemma we obtain strong completeness as a corollary.
Corollary 2.6. Under the conditions of Thm. 2.5, L is strongly complete for L-models.
Both Thm. 2.5 and Cor. 2.6 do apply to the case that L has frame conditions. When L is of rank 1
(i.e. Θ = ∅), Cor. 2.6 implies that L is strongly complete for (models based on) L-frames. In
the presence of frame conditions, the underlying frame of an L-model need not be an L-frame, so
that the question arises whether L is also strongly complete for L-frames. In applications, positive
answers to this question, usually referred to as the canonicity problem, typically rely on a judicious
choice of quasi-canonical model to ensure that the latter is an L-frame, often the largest quasi-
canonical model under some ordering on TS. Detailed examples are given in Sec. 3.
Remark 2.7. It is shown in [13] that T admits a strongly complete modal logic if T weakly pre-
serves (arbitrary) inverse limits and preserves finite sets. The essential contribution of the above
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result is to remove the latter restriction, which fails in important examples. Moreover, the observa-
tion that we need only consider surjective ω-cochains is relevant in some applications, see below.
Remark 2.8. A last point that needs clearing up is whether strong completeness of coalgebraic
modal logics can be established by some more general method than quasi-canonical models of the
quite specific shape used here. The answer is negative, at least in the case of rank-1 logics L: it has
been shown in [12] that every such L admits models which consist of the maximally satisfiable sets
of formulas and obey the truth lemma. Under strong completeness, such models are quasi-canonical.
This seems to contradict the fact that some canonical model constructions in the literature,
notably the canonical Kripke models for graded modal logics [8, 6], employ state spaces which
have multiple copies of maximally consistent sets. The above argument indicates that such logics
fail to be coalgebraic, and indeed this is the case for GML with Kripke semantics. As mentioned
above, GML has an alternative coalgebraic semantics over multigraphs, and we show below that
this semantics does admit quasi-canonical models in our sense.
3. Examples
We now show how the generic results of the previous section can be applied to obtain canonical
models and associated strong completeness and compactness theorems for a large variety of struc-
turally different modal logics. We have included some negative examples where canonical models
necessarily fail to exist due to non-compactness, and we analyse which conditions of Thm. 2.5 fail
in each case. We emphasise that in the positive examples, the verification of said conditions is
entirely stereotypical. Weak preservation of inverse limits of surjective ω-cochains usually holds
without the finiteness assumption, which is therefore typically omitted.
Example 3.1 (Strong completeness of Kripke semantics forK). Recall from Expl. 1.5.1 that Kripke
frames are coalgebras for the powerset functor TX = P(X). Strong completeness of K with
respect to Kripke semantics is, of course, well known. We briefly illustrate how this can be derived
from our coalgebraic treatment. To see that K is strongly one-step complete over finite sets X,
let Φ ⊆ Prop(ΛK(P(X))) be maximally one-step consistent. It is easy to check that {x ∈ X |
✸{x} ∈ Φ} satisfies Φ. To prove that the powerset functor weakly preserves inverse limits, let (Xn)
be an ω-cochain, and let (An ∈ P(Xn)) be a coherent family. Then (An) is itself a cochain, and the
set A = lim←−An ⊆ lim←−Xn induces (An) (w.r.t. the subset ordering on P(X)). Separation is clear.
By Thm. 2.5, there exists a quasi-canonical Kripke model for all normal modal logics. In particular,
the standard canonical model [4] is quasi-canonical; it witnesses strong completeness (w.r.t. frames)
of all canonical logics such as K4, S4, S5.
Example 3.2 (Failure of strong completeness of K over finitely branching models). As seen in
Expl. 1.5.1, finitely branching Kripke frames are coalgebras for the finite powerset functor Pω.
It is clear that quasi-canonical models fail to exist in this case, as compactness fails over finitely
branching frames: one can easily construct formulas φn that force a state to have at least n different
successors. The obstacle to the application of Thm. 2.5 is that the finite powerset functor fails to
preserve inverse limits weakly, as the inverse limit of an ω-cochain of finite sets may fail to be finite.
Example 3.3 (Conditional logic). Recall from Expl. 1.5.2 that the conditional logic CK is inter-
preted over the functor S(X) = P(X) → P(X). To prove strong one-step completeness over finite
sets X, let Φ ⊆ Prop(ΛCL(P(X))) be maximally one-step consistent. Define f : P(X) → P(X)
by f(A) =
⋂
{B ⊆ X | A⇒ B ∈ Φ}; it is mechanical to check that f |=1 Φ. To see that S weakly
preserves inverse limits, let (Xn) be a surjective ω-cochain, let X = lim←−Xn, and let (fn ∈ S(Xn))
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be coherent. Define f : P(X) → P(X) by letting (xn) ∈ f(A) for a coherent family (xn) ∈ X
iff whenever A = pi−1n [B] for some n and some B ⊆ Xn, then xn ∈ fn(B). Using surjectivity
of the projections of (Xn), it is straightforward to prove that f induces (fn). Finally, separation
is clear. By Thm. 2.5, it follows that the conditional logic CK has a quasi-canonical model, and
hence that CK is strongly complete for conditional frames. In the case of the additional rank-1
axioms mentioned in Expl. 1.3.2 and the corresponding subfunctors of S described in Expl. 1.9, the
situation is as follows.
Identity: The functor S{ID} weakly preserves inverse limits of surjective ω-cochains. In the
notation above, put (xn) ∈ f(A) iff the condition above holds and (xn) ∈ A.
Identity and disjunction: The functor S{ID ,DIS} weakly preserves inverse limits of surjective
ω-cochains: put (xn) ∈ f(A) iff (xn) ∈ A and whenever (xn) ∈ pi−1m B ⊆ A, then xm ∈ fm(B).
System C: It is open whether the the functor S{ID ,DIS ,CM} weakly preserves inverse limits of
surjective ω-cochains, and whether System C is strongly complete over conditional frames.
Indeed it appears to be an open problem to find any semantics for which System C is strongly
complete, other than the generalised neighbourhood semantics as described e.g. in [18], which is
strongly complete for very general reasons but provides little in the way of actual semantic infor-
mation. The classical preference semantics according to Lewis is only known to be weakly com-
plete [3]. Friedman and Halpern [9] do silently prove strong completeness of System C w.r.t. plau-
sibility measures; however, on close inspection the latter turn out to be essentially equivalent to the
above-mentioned generalised neighbourhood semantics. Moreover, Segerberg [19] proves strong
completeness for a whole range of conditional logics over general conditional frames, where, in
analogy to corresponding terminology for Kripke frames, a general conditional frame is equipped
with a distinguished set of admissible propositions limiting both the range of valuations and the
domain of selection functions. In contrast, our method yields full conditional frames in which the
frame conditions hold for any valuation of the propositional variables. While in the case of CK and
its extension by ID alone, these models differ from Segerberg’s only in that they insert default val-
ues for the selection function on non-admissible propositions, the canonical model for the extension
of CK by {ID ,DIS} has non-trivial structure on non-admissible propositions, and we believe that
our strong completeness result for this logic is genuinely new.
Example 3.4 (Strong completeness of GML over multigraphs). Recall from Expl. 1.5.3 that graded
modal logic (GML) has a coalgebraic semantics in terms of the multiset functor B∞. To prove
strong one-step completeness over finite sets X, let Φ ⊆ Prop(ΛGML(P(X))) be maximally one-
step consistent. We define B ∈ B∞(X) by B(A) ≥ n ⇐⇒ ≥n.A ∈ Φ; it is easy to check that B
is well-defined and additive. To prove weak preservation of inverse limits, let (Xn) be an ω-cochain,
let X = lim
←−
Xn, and let (Bn ∈ B∞(Xn)) be coherent. Then define B ∈ B∞(X) pointwise by
B((xn)) = min
n∈N
Bn(xn),
noting that the sequence (Bn(xn)) is decreasing by coherence. A straightforward computation
shows that B induces (Bn). Separation is clear.
By the above and Thm. 2.5, all extensions of GML have quasi-canonical multigraph models.
While the technical core of the construction is implicit in the work of Fine [8] and de Caro [6],
these authors were yet unaware of multigraph semantics, and hence our result that GML is strongly
complete over multigraphs has not been obtained previously.
The standard frame conditions for reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity (Expls. 1.5.3
and 1.7. 3) and arbitrary combinations thereof are easily seen to be satisfied in the quasi-canonical
model constructed above. We point out that this contrasts with Kripke semantics in the case of the
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graded version of S4, i.e. GML extended with the reflexivity and transitivity axioms of Expl. 1.5.3:
as shown in [7], the complete axiomatisation of graded modal logic over transitive reflexive Kripke
frames includes two rather strange combinatorial artefacts, which by the above disappear in the
multigraph semantics. The reason for the divergence (which we regard as an argument in favour of
multigraph semantics) is that, while in many cases multigraph models are easily transformed into
equivalent Kripke models by just making copies of states, no such translation exists in the transitive
reflexive case (transitivity alone is unproblematic).
Observe moreover that the above extends straightforwardly to decription logics ALCQ(R)
with qualified number restrictions and a role hierarchyRwhere roles may be distinguished as, in any
combination, transitive, reflexive, or symmetric. As shown in [10, 11], ALCQ(R) is undecidable
for many R, even when only transitive roles are considered. For undecidable logics, completeness
is in some sense the ‘next best thing’, as it guarantees if not recursiveness then at least recursive
enumerability of all valid formulas, and hence enables automatic reasoning. Essentially, our results
show that the natural axiomatisation of ALCQ(R) with transitive, symmetric and reflexive roles is
strongly complete over multigraphs, a result which fails for the standard Kripke semantics.
Example 3.5 (Failure of strong completeness of image-finite GML). Similarly to the case of image-
finite Kripke frames, one can model an image-finite version of graded modal logic coalgebraically
by exchanging the functor B∞ for the finite multiset functor B, where B(X) consists of all maps
X → N with finite support. Of course, the resulting logic is non-compact and hence fails to admit
a canonical model. This is witnessed not only by the same family of formulas as in the case of
image-finite Kripke semantics, which targets finiteness of the number of different successors, but
also by the set of formulas {≥n. a | n ∈ N}, which targets finiteness of multiplicities. Analysing
the conditions of Thm. 2.5, we detect two violations: not only does weak preservation of inverse
limits fail, but there is also no way to find an axiomatisation which is strongly one-step complete
over finite sets (again, consider sets {≥n. {x} | n ∈ N}).
Strong completeness of image-finite GML can be recovered by slight adjustments to the syntax and
semantics. We formulate a more general approach, as follows.
Example 3.6 (Strong completeness of the logic of additive measures). We fix an at most countable
commutative monoid M (e.g. M = N). We think of the elements of M as describing the measure
of a set of elements. To ensure compactness, we have to allow some sets to have undefined measure.
That is, we work with coalgebras for the endofunctor TM defined by
TM (X) = {(A, µ) | A ⊆ P(X) closed under disjoint unions, µ : A→M additive}
The modal logic of additive M -valued measures is given by the similarity type ΛM = {Em | m ∈
M} where Emφ expresses that φ has measure m, i.e.
[[Em]]XB = {(A, µ) ∈ TM (X) | B ∈ A, µ(B) = m}.
ΛM is clearly separating. The logic is axiomatised by the following two axioms:
Ema→ ¬Ena (n 6= m) and Em(a ∧ b) ∧ En(a ∧ ¬b)→ Em+na.
These axioms are strongly one-step complete over finite sets X: if Φ ⊆ Prop(ΛM (P(X))) is
maximally one-step consistent, then (A, µ) |=1 Φ where A ∈ A iff EmA ∈ Φ for some necessarily
unique m, in which case µ(A) = m. Moreover, TM weakly preserves inverse limits X = lim←−Xn,
with finite Xn: a coherent family ((An, µn) ∈ TM (Xn)) is induced by (A, µ) ∈ TM (X), where
A = {pi−1n [B] | n ∈ N, B ∈ An} and µ(pi−1n [B]) = µn(B) is easily seen to be well-defined and
additive. Theorem 2.5 now guarantees existence of quasi-canonical models. A simple example is
M = Z/2Z, which induces a logic of even and odd.
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For the case M = N, we obtain a variant of graded modal logic with finite multiplicities, where
we code ≥ k.φ as ¬
∨
0≤i<k Ekφ. However, it may still be the case that a state has a family of
successor sets of unbounded measure, so that undefinedness of the measure of the entire state space
just hides an occurrence of infinity. This defect is repaired by insisting that the measure of the whole
state space is finite at the expense of disallowing the modal operator E0 in the language, as follows.
Example 3.7 (Strong completeness of finitely branching GML−). To force the entire state space to
have finite measure, we additionally introduce a measurability operator E, interpreted by [[E]]B =
{(A, µ) | B ∈ A}, and impose obvious axioms guaranteeing that measures on X are defined on
boolean subalgebras of P(X), in particular E⊤ (i.e. µ(X) is finite), and Ena → Ea. In order to
achieve compactness, we now leave a bolt hole on the syntactical side and exclude the operator E0.
In other words, the syntax of GML− is given by the similarity type Λ−GML = {E} ∪ {En | n > 0},
and we interpret GML− over coalgebras for the functor BM defined by
BM(X) = {(A, µ) | A boolean subalgebra of P(X), µ : A→ N additive}.
Separation is clear. The axiomatisation of GML− is given by the axiomatisation of the modal logic
of additive measures, the above-mentioned axioms on E, and the additional axiom
Ena ∧ Eb→ En(a ∧ b) ∨ En(a ∧ ¬b) ∨
∨
0<k<n(Ek(a ∧ b) ∧ En−k(a ∧ ¬b))
which compensates for the absence of E0. Strong one-step completeness over finite sets and weak
preservation of inverse limits is shown analogously as in Expl. 3.6, so that we obtain a strongly
complete finitely branching graded modal logic GML−. The tradeoff is that the operator ≥ k.φ is
no longer expressible as ¬
∨
0≤i<k Eiφ in GML
− which only allows to formulate the implication
≥ 1.φ→ ≥n. φ.
Example 3.8 (Failure of strong completeness for PML over finitely supported probability distribu-
tions). Like image-finite graded modal logic, probabilistic modal logic as introduced in Expl. 1.5.4
fails to be compact, and violates the conditions of Thm. 2.5 on two counts, namely weak preser-
vation of inverse limits and strong one-step completeness over finite sets. The first issue is related
to image-finiteness, while the second is rooted in the structure of the real numbers: e.g. the set
{L1/2−1/na | n ∈ N} ∪ {¬L1/2a} is finitely satisfiable but not satisfiable.
Example 3.9 (Strong completeness of the logic of exact probabilities). In order to remove the
above-mentioned failure of compactness, we consider the fragment of probabilistic modal logic
containing only operators Ep stating that a given event has probability exactly p. (This is, of course,
less expressive than the operators Lp but still allows reasonable statements such as that rolling a six
on a die happens with probability 1/6.) Moreover, we require probabilities to be rational and allow
probabilities to be undefined, thus following the additive measures approach as outlined above,
where we consider a subfunctor of TQ defined by the requirement that the whole set has measure 1.
However, we are able to impose stronger conditions on the domain A ⊆ P(X) of a probability
measure P on X: we require that X ∈ A and that A,B ∈ A, B ⊆ A imply A−B ∈ FA, which is
reflected in the additional axioms E1⊤ and Epa∧Eq(a ∧ b)→ Ep−q(a ∧¬b). It is natural that we
cannot force closure under intersection, as there is in general no way to infer the exact probability
of A ∩ B from the probabilities of A and B. Along the same lines as above, we now obtain quasi-
canonical models, and hence strong completeness and compactness, of the arising modal logic of
exact probabilities.
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4. Conclusion
We have laid out a systematic method of proving existence of canonical models in a generic seman-
tic framework encompassing a wide range of structurally different modal logics. We have shown
how this method turns the construction of canonical models into an entirely mechanical exercise
where applicable, and points the way to obtaining compact fragments of non-compact logics. As
example applications, we have reproved a number of known strong completeness result and estab-
lished several new results of this kind; specifically, the latter includes strong completeness of the
following logics.
• The modal logic of exact probabilities, with operators Ep ‘with probability exactly p’.
• Graded modal logic over transitive reflexive multigraphs, i.e. the natural graded version of
S4, and more generally description logic with role hierarchies including transitive, reflexive, and
symmetric roles and qualified number restrictions also on non-simple (e.g. transitive) roles.
• The conditional logic CK+{ID ,DIS}, i.e. with the standard axioms of identity and disjunc-
tion, interpreted over conditional frames.
A number of interesting open problems remain, e.g. to find further strongly complete variants of
probabilistic modal logic or to establish strong completeness of the full set of standard axioms of
default logic, Burgess’ System C [3], over the corresponding class of conditional frames.
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